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"We do not accept the paradox that legal responsibility should be least where the
power is the greatest. "-Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the
United States at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal1
Introduction
In 1958, the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
(SPDC) began oil exploration in the region of Ogoniland, 2 a 404 square
mile area of land inhabited by 500,000 Ogoni, one of the 250 ethnic groups
of Nigeria. 3 In response to the negative consequences of oil exploration,
the Ogoni people mobilized to form the "Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People" (MOSOP) 4 in the early 1990s to prevent further oil pollu-
tion, which was contaminating their local water supply and ruining their
farmland.5 As protests grew in size and intensity, increased tension led to
the killing of four pro-oil Ogonis by a mob. 6 The Nigerian Government
responded by reinforcing the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force
(Task Force), a military unit created in January 1994 to pacify communal
violence. 7 The Task Force commenced raids of Ogoni villages in which
"whole communities were collectively punished for real or imputed associa-
tion with MOSOP." 8 Over the next several months, the Task Force report-
edly raided at least sixty towns and villages in Ogoniland. 9 These raids
reportedly became almost a nightly occurrence during the summer of 1994
and sometimes involved the indiscriminate shooting of civilians, rape, and
1. ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TmAL 73 (1983).
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d. Cir. 2010).
3. Joshua P. Newton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transna-
tional Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 261,
264 (1997); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE OGONI CRISIS: A CASE-STUDY OF MILITARY
REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (1995), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/country,,HRW,,NGA,,3ae6a7d8c,0.html [hereinafter HRW REPORT].
4. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
5. See HRW REPORT, supra note 3.
6. Id. The four prominent Ogoni leaders were brutally murdered at a meeting of
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property destruction. 10
Over a decade later, in 2002, several exiled Ogonis living in the United
States brought a suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 1" in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against SPDC
and other foreign oil companies for aiding and abetting the human rights
violations perpetrated by the Nigerian military forces. 12 While the Second
Circuit had previously held that individuals could be liable for aiding and
abetting under the ATS, 13 it had never directly addressed whether the ATS
extended jurisdiction to the courts to hear civil actions against corpora-
tions.14 On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 split, dismissed all claims
brought by the Ogonis. 15 Although a customary international legal norm
prohibits aiding and abetting human rights violations, the Kiobel court rea-
soned that because no additional preexisting norm of customary interna-
tional law extended civil liability to corporate actions, corporations could
not be subject to liability under the ATS. 16
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this ruling.17 Not only did
the court rule that corporate defendants in Kiobel could not be liable for
aiding and abetting under the ATS, but moreover, that no corporation could
be held liable under the ATS for any tort claim. The majority's rule strikes
a blow to the efforts of international law to protect human rights18 because
it allows entities that earn profits by commercial exploitation of fundamen-
tal human rights abuses to successfully shield those profits from victims'
claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the
heinous operation in the corporate form. 19 Due to the shallow pockets of
individuals and the insulation of state actors by the act of state doctrine,
the majority, by sterilizing the ATS's sting against corporate bodies, robs
ATS plaintiffs of access to the only entities that could possibly make them
whole again. 20
10. Id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA: MILITARY GOVERNMENT CLAMPDOWN
ON OPPOSITION 5 (1994) (noting that at least fifty Ogonis were reportedly executed extra-judicially by the Nigerian security forces in the wake of the May 21 murders and that
some were shot at close range).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
12. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
13. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the Court did not reach the question of whether
corporations could be held liable for violations of customary international law because
the defendants did not raise the issue).
14. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
15. Id. at 149.
16. Id. at 148-49.
17. See Abayomi Azikiwe, U.S. Court Denies the Right to Sue Corporations, WORKERS
WORLD (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.workers.org/2010/world/nigeria-0930.
18. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 196 (Leval, J., concurring). Judge Leval concurred only in
the judgment. He rejected the majority's reasoning, but agreed with the final outcome
because the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants acted with purpose.
19. Id. at 149-50.
20. In the months after the Kiobel decision, district courts in the D.C. Circuit and
Seventh Circuit chose to follow Kiobel's lead due to a lack of ATS precedents on point
from their own districts. See Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010). On
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This Note argues that ATS liability should extend to corporations, but
that a reasonableness test should limit jurisdiction when the controversy
implicates substantial foreign interests. If the majority's reasoning were
valid, the International Tribunal at Nuremburg, one of the pillars of inter-
national law and the case on which the Kiobel majority most heavily relies,
could not have prosecuted individual actors who had not previously been
subjected to international law. The Kiobel outcome also conflicts with
prior Second Circuit decisions that seemingly allow corporate civil liability
under the ATS.2 1 Finally, the majority holding in Kiobel violates a funda-
mental rule-of-law principle by excepting from an important international
rule the actors with the greatest capacity to violate it. For these reasons,
this Note will argue that an additional norm of customary international
law extending liability to an actor-type is not required to hold the actor
liable under the ATS. Thus, the ATS can provide recovery to human rights
victims injured at the hands of corporations.
Nevertheless, the failure of Kiobel to soundly preclude corporate cases,
given the broad jurisdictional enabling language of the ATS, could give rise
to serious consequences that include, but are not limited to: increases in
international forum shopping, due process violations, severe burdens on
U.S. courts, undue influence by U.S. courts on corporate conduct and com-
mercial economies abroad, and negative impact on international political
and legal relations. This Note will also demonstrate how a reasonableness
test for international comity can limit the impact of these externalities.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I frames the Kiobel holding
within the current state ATS litigation by outlining the history of the ATS.
Part II describes the reasoning of the majority opinion in Kiobel. Part III
analyzes the majority's argument with respect to the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg, 22 prior Second Circuit ATS litigation, and the rule-
of-law principle that no entity should stand outside of the law. Part IV
examines the problems raised by the failure of the Kiobel court to preclude
corporate liability. Part V explores how a reasonableness test for ATS cases
might properly limit U.S. jurisdiction, if courts decline to follow Kiobel and
instead impose liability on corporations. Part VI considers two possible
shortcomings of the reasonableness test.
I. The History of the ATS
A. The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute became law in 1789 as part of the First Judici-
ary Act and enabled foreign citizens to seek justice for injuries caused by
appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court in Flomo and held that corpo-
rations can be civilly liable under the ATS. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643
F.3d 1013, (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's decision on different grounds).
This holding is directly at odds with the Kiobel holding.
21. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d
Cir. 2009).
22. This analysis will incorporate Judge Leval's criminal/civil distinction.
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acts of piracy, which by their nature often occurred outside the territory of
the United States and the citizen's sovereign. 23 The original language of
the statute read "[t]hat the district courts shall have, exclusively of the
courts of the several States, cognizance . . . concurrent with the courts of
the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."' 2 4 The operative part of the ATS-that jurisdic-
tion is granted only for torts in "violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States"-has generally remained unchanged. 25
While treaties clearly delineate obligations and restrict actors' con-
duct, discerning modes of conduct that fall under the customary umbrella
of the "law of nations" presents greater difficulties. Historical sources, like
Blackstone's Treatises, provide an insight as to what this term meant at the
time of the First Judicial Act. 2 6 Blackstone defines the law of nations as "a
system of rules . . .established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitance of the world; in order to decide all disputes which . . . must
frequently occur between two or more independent nations, and the indi-
viduals belonging to each."27 For Blackstone, three primary offenses con-
stitute violations of the law of nations: violation of safe conduct,
interference with ambassadors, and piracy on the high seas. 2 8
History shows that with the exception of piracy cases, plaintiffs rarely
invoked the ATS. 29 However, in 1980, nearly 200 years after the firstJudi-
ciary Act, the Second Circuit sparked the modern use of the ATS with its
influential decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.30 Thus, after two centuries of
disuse, the Second Circuit undertook the task of reviving and reshaping
the ATS law-of-nations standard as it applied to U.S. courts. However,
because the drafters of the ATS understood common law to "provide a
cause of action for [only] the modest number of international law viola-
tions . . . at the time," 31 the court faced an exponentially larger body of
modern international law to interpret and analyze.
23. See Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
207, 211 (2008).
24. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Mark W. Wilson, Why Private Remedies for
Environmental Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute Should Not Be Constrained by the Judi-
cially Created Doctrines ofJus Cogens and Exhaustion, 39 LEwis & CLARK ENvTL. L. J.
451, 455 (2009) (noting that the current wording of the ATS was enacted in 1911 by the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1911).
26. See Wilson, supra note 25, at 458.
27. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66, available at http://www.lonang.com/
exlibris/blackstone/bla-405.htm.
28. Id. at *68.
29. See Wilson, supra note 25, at 455.
30. JEFFREY DUNOFF, STEVEN RATNER & DAVID WPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 300 (3d ed. 2010).
31. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
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B. Developing the Standards: ATS Precedents
1. Developing General Standards
In Filartiga, Paraguayan plaintiffs, a father and son, brought a com-
plaint against a Paraguayan defendant for wrongfully causing the death of
their son.3 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, the former Inspector
General of Police in Asunci6n, kidnapped and tortured the son due to the
father's political dissidence. 33 Although the District Court initially dis-
missed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit
reversed and held that acts of torture committed by individuals acting
under official authority clearly constituted a violation of the laws of
nations.34 In making this determination, the Filartiga court looked to the
sources from which customary international law is derived-the usage of
nations, judicial opinions, and the work of jurists. 35 Because those
sources showed the "universal renunciation in the modern usage and prac-
tice of nations,"3 6 the Second Circuit held that the district court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the ATS to hear the plaintiffs' action.3 7
While the number of ATS cases increased in number and diversified in
subject matter after Filartiga,38 the Supreme Court has only heard one case
on the ATS-Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.39 In Sosa, a Mexican national
brought a claim against the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
under the ATS for allegedly violating his civil rights by kidnapping him in
Mexico and bringing him to trial in the United States for the murder of a
DEA agent.40 Sosa's singularity makes it an important case for several rea-
sons. First, the Supreme Court determined that the ATS was a jurisdic-
tional grant and did not create a new cause of action.4 1 Second, the Court
applied the standard of "specific, universal, and obligatory" in its consider-
ation of alleged violations of the law of nations to limit jurisdiction to a
narrow category.4 2 The Court held that the plaintiffs "illegal detention of
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 884. In determining which sources were relevant to customary interna-
tional law, the Second Circuit looked to The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900),
which reaffirmed that "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legisla-
tive act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . who
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat."
36. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883.
37. Id. at 878. The Second Circuit proposed in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.
that there are three elements necessary to have a valid claim under the ATS: "plaintiffs
must (i) be 'aliens,' (ii) claiming damages for a 'tort only,' (iii) resulting from a violation
'of the law of nations' or of 'a treaty of the United States."' Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 242, 242 (2d Cir. 2003).
38. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WiPPMAN, supra note 30, at 302.
39. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
40. Id. at 695. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his arbitrary arrest violated
customary international law. Id.
41. Id. at 713.
42. Id. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring). This standard comes from In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
Vol. 44
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less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities
and a prompt arraignment, violate[d] no norm of customary international
law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."
4 3
Finally, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to consider whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a given norm to the per-
petrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corpora-
tion or individual.4 4
2. Consideration of Aiding and Abetting and Corporate Liability
After Sosa offered these standards, the Second Circuit determined that
an actor need not be the principal perpetrator to be liable for under the
ATS by holding that aiding and abetting human rights violations consti-
tuted a violation of the law of nations. 45 In considering state practice in
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., the Second Circuit held that liability
for individuals who aid and abet a violation of international law is a rule
that states universally abide by out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern. 4 6 Additionally, looking to treaties and the statutes creat-
ing international tribunals, the Second Circuit found the concept of crimi-
nal aiding and abetting to be "well established in international law." 47
Judge Katzmann's concurrence 48 set forth the standard: a "defendant
may be held liable under international law for aiding and abetting the vio-
lation of that law by another when the defendant (1) provides practical
assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetra-
tion of the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the com-
mission of that crime."'4 9 In determining this standard, Judge Katzmann
looked to international law to determine whether the scope of liability for a
violation of international law should extend to aiders and abettors. 50
Judge Hall, also concurring, noted that international law does not specify
the "means of its domestic enforcement."5 1 The combination of these two
opinions-that liability should extend to aiding and abetting and that
nations have the freedom to determine how to treat violators-intimates
that corporate entities can violate the law of nations and be held liable
under the ATS.
While Khulamani specifically recognized aiding and abetting as a lia-
bility-creating offense, the landmark case for corporate liability is Doe v.
43. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
44. Id. at 732 n.20.
45. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007). Other
circuits had previously addressed the possibility of holding a defendant liable for aiding
and abetting violations of the law of nations like the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
46. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. This concurrence is important because the majorities in both Talisman Energy
and Kiobel rely upon it.
49. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 269.
51. Id. at 286 (Hall, J., concurring) (quoting the Brief for the International Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae at 5-6).
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Unocal Corp.,52 which allowed such liability. In Unocal, Burmese citizens
accused Unocal, a subsidiary of an American oil company, of providing the
Burmese government with funding for forced labor from which Unocal
benefited. 53 While a factual question prevented the Ninth Circuit from
holding Unocal liable, it certainly recognized the possibility that corpora-
tions could be held liable under the ATS. 5 4 So long as Unocal met the
Ninth Circuit's standards for aiding and abetting, the court reasoned that
"Unocal may be liable under the [ATS] for aiding and abetting the
Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor."5 5
Although ATS claims against corporations began to increase substan-
tially after Unocal,5 6 the Second Circuit only flirted with ATS corporate
civil liability in cases like Khulumani until Kiobel. Approximately one year
before Kiobel, the Second Circuit decided Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy,5 7 where it appeared to lay the foundation for corporate
liability but declined to address the issue head on. In Talisman Energy,
Sudanese plaintiffs alleged that a corporation aided and abetted human
rights abuses. 58 The main issue on appeal was the requisite mens rea for
aiding and abetting liability. 59 Guided by the concurring opinions of
Judge Katzmann and Judge Hall in Khulumani, the majority looked to inter-
national law to determine that the defendant must act with purpose.60 The
majority then engaged in a lengthy discussion about whether the defendant
corporation, Talisman Energy, acted with purpose.6 1 The court's analysis
implicitly recognized that corporations could be held liable for aiding and
abetting.6 2 If corporations cannot be held civilly liable under the ATS, the
facts of the case would have been immaterial. Thus, the Second Circuit
had plodded toward recognition of ATS corporate liability by the time it
heard the Kiobel appeal.
II. The Case Preventing Corporate ATS Liability: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.
A. Historical and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs in Kiobel formerly resided in the Ogoni Region of Nige-
52. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 939.
54. Id. at 953.
55. Id. at 947.
56. PJ. Kee, Expanding the Duties of the Vigilant Doorkeeper: ATS Litigation and the
Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine and Forum Non Conveniens, 83 TUL. L. REV.
495, 501 (2008).
57. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
58. Id. at 251.
59. Id. at 257.
60. Id. at 259.
61. Id. at 260-65.
62. After it established purpose as a standard, the court actually considered whether
Talisman acted with purpose. It framed the factual issue as follows: "Therefore, in
reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment to Talisman, we must test
plaintiffs' evidence to see if it supports an inference that Talisman acted with the 'pur-
pose' to advance the Government's human rights abuses." Id. at 260.
Vol. 44
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ria.6 3 They alleged that the corporate defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company (Royal Dutch) and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC
(Shell), through a subsidiary, SPDC, aided and abetted the Nigerian gov-
ernment in committing human rights abuses directed at plaintiffs.64 Royal
Dutch and Shell are incorporated in the Netherlands and the United King-
dom, respectively, while SPDC is incorporated in Nigeria. 65 All defendants
are corporations, entities that are "juridical" persons, rather than "natural"
persons. 66
SPDC began oil exploration and production in the Ogoni region of
Nigeria in 1958.67 To protest the environmental impact of SPDC's local oil
exploration, some residents of the Ogoni region organized a group named
the "Movement for Survival of Ogoni People."'6 8 When the protests halted
oil production,69 the plaintiffs alleged that defendants responded by enlist-
ing the aid of the Nigerian government to suppress the MOSOP resistance
in 1993.70 Plaintiffs alleged that throughout 1993 and 1994, Nigerian mil-
itary forces shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages-
beating children and the elderly, raping and arresting residents, and
destroying or looting property-all with the assistance of the corporate
defendants. 7 1 The human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian
Task Forces constitute what is now more commonly known as the "Ogoni
Crisis."
7 2
Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants under the ATS for
aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in alleged violations of the
law of nations.73 Specifically, plaintiffs brought claims of aiding and abet-
ting: (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6)
forced exile; and (7) property destruction.7 4 Reasoning that the defend-
ants could not be held liable for counts (1), (5), (6), and (7) because inter-






69. See Newton, supra note 3, at 269-70 ("Continuing protests, some violent, led
Shell to suspend its operations in Ogoniland in mid-1993, but it continues to exploit oil
resources in other parts of the Niger Delta region.").
70. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
71. Id.; see also HRW REPORT, supra note 3 ("Soldiers and mobile police stormed
houses, breaking down doors and windows with their boots, the butts of their guns, and
machetes. Villagers who crossed their path, including children and the elderly, were
severely beaten, forced to pay 'settlement fees,' and sometimes shot. Many women were
raped. Security forces randomly arrested and detained several hundred Ogonis, prima-
rily young men... Before leaving, troops looted money, food, livestock, and other prop-
erty. Although major troop movements in the region appear to have tapered off by late
August 1994, the security forces reportedly continue to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and
beat Ogoni civilians.").
72. See HRW REPORT, supra note 3.
73. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
74. Id.
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national law did not sufficiently define those violations, the District Court
dismissed those claims. 75 However, the District Court, while denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss the three remaining claims, also elected to
certify its entire order for interlocutory appeal.76 Thus, the Second Circuit
reviewed all seven claims. 77
B. The Majority's Reasoning
The majority, which dismissed the entire complaint, split its opinion
into two sections. The first part argued that in addition to the presence of
an international norm against aiding and abetting, an additional actor-type
norm assigning liability to corporations for violating that norm was neces-
sary for corporate ATS liability. 78 The second part argued that no such
actor-type norm existed. 79
First, the Kiobel Court determined that international law governed its
inquiry by looking to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States and the concept of international personhood.80 The
majority noted that international law is not silent on the question of its
subjects,8 ' but also admits that "individuals and private juridical entities
can have ... rights or duties given [to] them by international law."'8 2 As an
example delimiting subjects, the majority cited the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), which without precedent for individual lia-
bility, held that state officials could be held liable for violation of the spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory norms of international human rights.8 3 The
majority also cited the Supreme Court's instruction in Sosa to look to inter-
national law to determine the scope of liability.8 4 The part of the Sosa deci-
sion most helpful to the majority's argument is Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion, which charged courts to consider "whether international law
extends the scope of liability to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor."8 5
75. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d. 457, 464-68 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
76. Id.
77. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
78. Id. at 131.
79. Id. at 148.
80. Id. at 126.
81. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II,
introductory note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
83. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126-27.
84. Id. at 127.
85. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). It
should also be noted that the ATS does not apply to actions against states. The only
basis for jurisdiction over an action by a plaintiff against a foreign state is the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2009); see also Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (limiting jurisdiction against
foreign sovereigns to those circumstances allowed by FSIA). Section 1605 grants juris-
diction for a suit against a foreign state for a tort that occurred within the borders of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2007).
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Under the Second Circuit's interpretation of Sosa, the norm of interna-
tional law must extend liability to the type of perpetrator the plaintiff seeks
to sue.8 6 According to the majority, for an actor to be liable under the ATS,
the actor not only has to violate a norm of conduct of customary interna-
tional law, but there also needs to be a customary international law norm
for holding that type of actor liable for violating the particular norm of
conduct.8 7 The majority considered whether international law extends
civil liability to corporations primarily by looking again to the IMT at
Nuremberg, which addressed only criminal liability for individuals. 88
While individual liability for crimes committed in violation of the law
of nations during wartime had arisen to a small degree after World War 1, it
was not until after World War II that such liability was greatly consid-
ered.8 9 In the wake of the Holocaust, the United States, Great Britain,
France, Soviet Union, and twenty-one other states signed the London Char-
ter, which established the IMT to try German war criminals who allegedly
orchestrated war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against
peace. 90 As mentioned above, the Nazi defendants contended that they
could not be guilty of war crimes because international law had never pro-
vided punishment for individuals. 9 1 Despite the lack of precedent for indi-
vidual liability, the IMT held that "individuals could be punished for
violations of international law."9 2 However, when the issue of corporate
liability arose with respect to I.G. Farben (a German corporation that man-
ufactured Zyklon B, the killing chemical in the gas chambers), the IMT
refused to consider imposing criminal liability for the corporation.9 3
Despite the focus of the IMT in expanding international crimes to encom-
pass individuals, the majority treated the failure of the IMT to criminally
prosecute the "most nefarious corporate enterprise known to the civilized
world" as clear evidence that corporate liability was not recognized as a
norm of customary international law.94
After attempting to establish the non-recognition of criminal liability
for corporations at the time of the IMT, the majority looked to subsequent
international tribunals, treaties, and the works of publicists to further sup-
port its position.95 The majority referenced the two most influential inter-
national tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
86. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
87. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.
88. Id. at 132-36.
89. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 30, at 567 (calling the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg "[t]he watershed for individual accountability").
90. Id. (noting that the IMT tried twenty-two defendants, and convicted all but three
of at least one charge).
91. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 135.
94. Id.
95. Id at 136-45.
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(ICTR), both of which limit liability to "natural persons. '96 It also cited the
International Criminal Court's (ICC) rejection of a French proposal to
expand the ICC's jurisdiction beyond natural persons to "juridical per-
sons."97 The majority found it "abundantly clear" that modern tribunals
have not treated corporate criminal liability as a norm of international law
since Nuremberg. 98
The majority then argued that the few international treaties involving
corporate liability impose obligations limited specifically to the subject
matter of the treaties, and therefore, treaties cannot be sources that support
corporate liability in customary international law.9 9 Although customary
law does not require "universal practice,"'100 the majority further argued
that to find that "a treaty embodies or creates a rule of customary interna-
tional law [would] mean[ ] that the rule applies beyond the limited subject
matter of the treaty and to nations that have not ratified it."''1 While such
a finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the workings of customary
international law, 10 2 the majority concluded that treaties provide no relief
for the Ogonis. 10 3
As final support for its position, the majority looked to the work of
publicists-in particular the testimony of Professors Christopher Green-
wood and James Crawford in Talisman Energy. In their testimony, they
declared that no tribunal has "so far recognized corporate liability, as
opposed to individual liability, in a civil or criminal context on the basis of
a violation of the law of nations or customary international law."'1 4 The
professors' comments generally restate the arguments offered by the major-
ity with respect to the express limitations of the ICC, ICTR, and ICTY to
natural persons. Accordingly, the majority held that the ATS does not pro-
vide subject matter jurisdiction over claims against corporations.10 5
96. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General, Report Pur-
suant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 ("Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral"), art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) ("The International Tribunal shall have
jurisdiction over natural persons .. "); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
art. 5, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
97. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 138.
100. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 30, at 78.
101. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138.
102. Consider when a treaty merely reflects the position of other sources of custom-
ary international law, like state practice or the rulings of international tribunals. For
instance, it would not be inconsistent with international law to hold a state actor respon-
sible for a universally condemned act like torture, even if the state was not party to the
Convention Against Torture. Thus, while the majority points out an alarming conse-
quence of overstating the significance of treaties, this problem is avoided when other
sources of international law support the near universality of the idea or norm that the
treaty puts forward.
103. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138 (noting that treaties, "in light of their limited number
and specialized subject matter, [cannot] be viewed as crystallizing a norm of customary
international law").
104. Id. at 143.
105. Id. at 149.
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In summary, the majority justified its dismissal by driving a wedge
between a norm of customary international law and liability for the type of
actor that violates it. 10 6 The majority essentially argued that unless inter-
national law explicitly and universally holds corporations criminally liable
for a target offense, no corporation can ever be held liable under the ATS.
This conclusion is possibly incorrect for several reasons. This Note will
now explore why the Kiobel majority's presumption is erroneous by consid-
ering the IMT at Nuremberg, 10 7 and then offer support for why corpora-
tions could be held civilly liable for violations of the law of nations by
looking at consistency with the precedents of Khulumani, Talisman Energy,
and Citizen's United v. Federal Election Commission,' °8 as well as with gen-
eral rule-of-law principles.
III. The Possibility of Corporate Liability Under the ATS
A. International Law Sets Forth Its Norms and Nations Have the Power
to Prosecute Actors Who Violate Those Norms: Nuremberg as
an Example
The majority heavily cited the IMT at Nuremberg as support for its
proposition that customary international law must denote specific liability
for the type of actor that violates its norms.' 0 9 The majority's use of
Nuremberg and other criminal tribunals is misguided for two reasons.
First, if the majority's major premise were true, individual liability at
Nuremberg would have been contrary to international law because there
was no opinion juris for holding individuals liable for violation of the law of
nations at the time of the tribunal. Because this cannot be the case,
Nuremburg shows that an actor-type norm is not required to hold an actor
liable for a violation of a fundamental norm. Second, the refusal of the
IMT, ICTR, and ICTY to prosecute corporations should be interpreted as
excluding subjects whose prosecution was not practical given the nature of
106. Id.
107. The "dissent" by Judge Leval would hold the corporations liable, and he attacks
the majority's failure to distinguish between the criminal nature of the IMT, ICTY, and
ICTR, and the civil nature of the ATS. Parts of the dissent will be addressed infra in Part
IlA, but a brief outline of his argument is helpful here. Judge Leval argues that interna-
tional criminal precedent refusing to hold corporations liable should have no bearing on
corporate civil liability. Id. at 151 (Leval, J., concurring) (rejecting the majority's actor-
type requirement but concurring in the result because the plaintiff had not shown that
the defendant acted with purpose). He contends that because the law of nations takes
no position on whether its norms may be enforced by civil actions for compensatory
damages, U.S. courts should have the discretion to hear ATS cases brought against cor-
porations. Id. at 176. However, for Leval's argument to be successful, it must overcome
the majority's presumption that the law of nations must designate liability for a particu-
lar type of actor for violating a particular norm. Careful consideration of the IMT at
Nuremburg shows not only that the IMT would not have been possible if the IMT fol-
lowed the Kiobel majority (Leval notes this point), but also more forcefully demonstrates
that Nuremburg, one of the pillars of international law, stands for the proposition that
prior actor-type designation is not a necessary predicate for liability.
108. Citizen's United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
109. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136-45.
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the criminal tribunals and not as precedent in support of denying corpo-
rate liability under international law. 1 10
As to the first point, even the majority pointed out that the "defining
legal achievement of the Nuremberg trials is that they explicitly recognized
individual liability for the violation of specific, universal, and obligatory
norms of international human rights."I'1 1 Before the Nuremberg Tribunal,
state officials could not be held responsible for the crime of aggression or
actions that amounted to human rights violations. 1 1 2 In helping set the
parameters for the tribunal, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson,
appointed by President Truman to head the Tribunal, 113 addressed this
lack of precedent.1 14 Jackson focused on the universal, judicial illegality of
aggressive war-making and maintained that state officials should not be
exempted from an obligation to refrain from such action. According to
Jackson, the universality of the crimes prevented the absence of previous
individual liability from providing an obstacle to prosecution."l 5 He rea-
soned that international law must grow "through decisions reached from
time to time and adapting settled principles to new situations."' "
16
The Nazi defendants at Nuremberg actually raised the lack of prece-
dent at trial by arguing that international law concerned the acts of states
and provided no punishment for individual state officials. 117 The IMT
expressly rejected their argument and held that individuals could be pun-
ished for violations of international law. 118 Although it is evident from the
IMT that international law, and not individual states, determines its sub-
jects, 1 9 Nuremberg supports the proposition that the foremost considera-
tion of liability for breach of an international norm is the norm itself.
Under Nuremberg, international law permits liability of an actor who vio-
lates that norm, even if the international law has never held an actor of that
type liable. 120
110. This is largely the point of Judge Leval's dissent. However, the distinction
between the two is moot as applied to corporate civil liability if the law of nations
requires an actor-type liability norm. Thus, the first consideration of this argument is
paramount.
111. Id. at 127.
112. TUSA & TuSA, supra note 1, at 73.
113. Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 73.
115. See id. (noting that Jackson, when considering whether state officials could be
held liable for the crime of aggression, was "not worried about a lack of precedents or
the absence of legislation").
116. Id.
117. United States v. Goering (The Nuremberg Trial), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
118. Id.
119. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010).
120. This is not to say that international law never prescribes liability for certain
types of actors. Often the opposite is true. For instance, certain offenses of interna-
tional law can only be perpetrated by states. The main point of this Part is to argue that
an absence of precedent for holding a certain type of actor liable does not necessarily
prevent liability. Because aiding and abetting human rights violations is a norm that
clearly applies to private actors, the case for holding corporations liable is stronger.
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The Kiobel majority's argument is irreconcilably inconsistent with the
outcome of Nuremburg. The majority held that an actor is only liable
under international law if international law universally accepts liability for
that type of actor, 12 1 but admitted that the IMT, which applied interna-
tional law, held individual war criminals liable in the absence of precedent
for individual liability. 12 2 Moreover, the IMT was not simply the culmina-
tion of years of international case law and legislation to establish individ-
ual liability. Rather, it was an abrupt and near revolutionary landmark
event in international law. Thus, in keeping with the majority's holding,12 3
it cannot be the case that a single international court establishes an inter-
national legal norm with a single decision. If the majority's holding were
correct, the IMT should not have punished state officials. As few recent
scholars have questioned the legal legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it
seems more likely that the majority's rationale is misguided.
Therefore, with respect to corporate civil liability under international
law, Judge Leval's dissent in Kiobel aligns itself more closely to the princi-
ples of the IMT. Judge Leval argued: "The law of nations sets worldwide
norm of conduct, prohibiting certain universally condemned, heinous acts.
That body of law, however, takes no position on whether its norms may be
enforced by civil actions for compensatory damages."'12 4 Indeed, Nurem-
berg illustrates how corporate liability is possible. Because no actor-type
precedent is necessary, the non-position of international law with regard to
liability for a type of actor does not prevent that actor from being liable. 125
Thus, the IMT did not "accept the paradox that legal responsibility should
be least where the power is the greatest.' '126
Secondly, although international law may permit liability for a type of
actor without precedent for violating a universal norm, the explicit refusal
of international law to recognize such liability may preclude liability based
solely on international law. However, such substantial differences exist
between civil and corporate liability that one must explore whether the pur-
poses and elements of each liability are sufficiently similar to infer that
corporations cannot be held civilly liable under international law from the
fact that international tribunals have refused to hold them criminally lia-
ble. The majority used the IMT's refusal to criminally prosecute corpora-
tions precisely in this way-as support for corporate civil non-liability
under the ATS. However, the link between the two is too attenuated to
provide for the inference.
121. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.
122. Id. at 126-27.
123. See id. (arguing that the type of liability must be a universally accepted norm of
the civilized world). This precludes the majority from arguing that an extraordinary
case, such as Nuremberg, can establish a norm of liability. After all, there was no prece-
dent before Nuremberg, so it is impossible that individual liability before Nuremberg
was a universal and specific accepted norm.
124. Id. at 153 (Leval, J., concurring).
125. This is contrary to the majority's opinion, which requires universal acceptance
of liability for a certain type of actor for the actor to be liable.
126. See TuSA & TusA, supra note 1, at 73.
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Justice Leval's dissent is perhaps the best exposition of the importance
of distinguishing criminal and civil liability under international law. He
argued that the reasons why international tribunals have been "established
without jurisdiction to impose criminal liability on corporations have to do
solely with the theory and the objectives of criminal punishment, and have
no bearing on civil compensatory liability."'127 Moreover, criminal punish-
ment does not achieve its principle objectives when it is imposed on an
abstract entity that exists as a purely legal construct.1 28 Criminal punish-
ment, which seeks to inflict meaningful suffering upon persons who vio-
late the law, has several objectives including:
* Give society the satisfaction of retribution of seeing that one who has bro-
ken its rules and has caused suffering is required in turn to endure
suffering.
* Disable the offender from further criminal conduct during imprisonment.
* Change the criminal's conduct, bringing about repentance or at least, his
realization that further criminal conduct will result in more severe
punishment.
* Dissuade others similarly situated from criminal conduct. 1 29
Judge Leval correctly concluded that criminal punishment realizes none of
these objectives when its target is a corporation. 130 For this reason, the
IMT sought to punish corporate executives and not corporations. 1 3 1 The
majority cited the non-prosecution of I.G. Farben as a support for its opin-
ion, but the case further underscores the inapplicability of criminal penal-
ties for corporations. 132 Crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 133
On the other hand, the principal purpose of civil tort liability is to
compensate victims of illegal conduct for the harms inflicted on them and
127. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 151 (Leval, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 168.
129. Id. at 167 (summarizing Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, Sentence, ' 2 (June 1, 2001)).
130. Id. at 168. Leval is certainly right if the criminal punishment is imprisonment,
for the nature of a corporation makes this type of punishment impossible. The other
criminal alternative would be to impose fines for criminal violations. The problem on
the international level would be the recipient. It makes little sense for a corporation to
pay the international community as a whole, or the government of the place of the tort-
especially in ATS cases where the government is often complicit. The logical and fair
conclusion would be to pay the victims to make them whole, which is essentially the
function of civil liability.
131. United States v. Krauch (The IG Farben Trial), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1080, 1152 (1952) [hereinafter The IG Farben Trial].
132. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135 (quoting The IG Farben Trial, supra note 131, at 1152,
which noted "the corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and
cannot be subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings").
133. United States v. Goering (The Nuremberg Trial), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). In its
proper context, a refusal to limit international law to sovereign states should be read to
mean that abstract entities should not be criminally liable; it does not follow that
abstract entities should not be civilly liable.
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to restore them to what is rightfully theirs. 1 34 Unlike the gap between
criminal punishment objectives and corporate violators, holding corpora-
tions, which earn substantial amounts of gain from these violations, civilly
liable would forward the objective of civil liability. International law distin-
guishes between civil and corporate liability, 13 5 and thus, a ruling on one
type of liability should not be treated as conclusive and binding to the
other. 136 Therefore, because the fundamental question of the Nuremberg
and subsequent tribunals was that of individual moral responsibility, 13 7
the decisions to exclude corporations from criminal liability should not
influence the possibility of corporate civil liability under international law.
Judge Leval further argued that the distinction is meaningful because
there is "an absence of precedent for the majority's rule" that actor-type
liability is always required under international law, and, therefore, that
courts should have discretion to hear cases against corporations. 1 38
Because Nuremberg required no such actor-type norm, it actually exists as
significant precedent against the majority view. Judge Leval's line of rea-
soning is deficient because it relies on the mere non-existence of precedent
denying civil corporate liability under international law to infer
permissibility.
Because Nuremberg, a generally accepted and even revered develop-
ment in international law, stands for the proposition that actor-type prece-
dent is unnecessary, Judge Leval's inference may be avoided. While Judge
Leval contends that no precedent exists for the majority's requirement,
Nuremburg goes further in demonstrating that such a requirement is mis-
guided. Because the IMT held individuals liable without precedent, it fol-
lows that corporations could be held liable without precedent for violating
customary international legal norms. 139 Thus, Nuremberg, as a concrete
precedent for the non-essentiality of an international law norm for actor-
type liability, strengthens the foundation of Leval's civil/corporate distinc-
tion and illuminates the possibility of corporate liability under the ATS.
B. Kiobel Departs from Second Circuit and Supreme Court Precedent
Although the Nuremberg precedent demonstrates that international
law need not specifically designate liability for a certain type of actor
before holding the actor liable for a violation of its norms, the absence of
134. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 169 (Leval, J., concurring) (referencing Andre Tunc, Prelimi-
nary Remarks, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 96 (Andre
Tunc ed., 1983).
135. Id.
136. In addition to the difference in aims of civil and criminal law, application of one
country's criminal law to acts that occurred outside its borders is often viewed as more
intrusive. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403 cmt. 8 (1987) ("It is generally accepted
by enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over
activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil
jurisdiction over the same activity, and only upon strong justification.").
137. See TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 155.
138. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring).
139. That is to say that Nuremberg precedent makes prosecution permissible. It
bridges the gap of Leval's inference.
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explicit international law defining the rights and obligations of corpora-
tions under international law is unhelpful to the plaintiffs. Nevertheless,
this section will offer support for corporate liability, not because of actual
international legal precedent for corporate liability, but rather that interna-
tional law permits liability for those who violate its norm and that U.S.
case law weighs in favor of doing so.
The Second Circuit has explicitly recognized the substantial interest of
the United States to hear human rights cases. 140 The Khulumani and Talis-
man Energy cases lay the foundation for corporate civil liability as a way to
forward that interest. As described above, Khulumani held that aiding and
abetting human rights violations was an actionable offense under the
ATS.141 While the Kiobel majority argued its decision comports with
Khulumani,14 2 it erroneously narrows the focus of Judge Katzmann's con-
currence in Khulumani, which, according to Judge Katzmann, presented
the question of whether the law of nations would "recognize the defend-
ants' responsibility for that violation."'143 In its context, this quote should
be read to consider whether international law extends liability to aiders
and abettors, and not the type of aider and abettor. 144 Because Judge
Katzmann stated that international law permits "independent judicial rec-
ognition of actionable international norms,"'145 it is clear that he examined
the international norm of aiding and abetting liability, and not that norm
as applied to states, individuals, or corporations. 14 6 The majority improp-
erly uses international distinctions between abettors and principle actors
on the one hand and states and private actors on the other to conclude that
140. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he
district court did not accord proper significance to a choice of forum by lawful U.S.
resident plaintiffs or to the policy interest implicit in our federal statutory law in provid-
ing a forum for adjudication of claims of violations of the law of nations."). It should be
noted, however, that the plaintiffs in Wiwa were American citizens. The court also
afforded substantial deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum. See id. at 101.
141. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007).
142. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129.
143. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 277. Judge Katzmann found "no source of international law that recog-
nizes liability for aiding and abetting a violation of international law, but would not
authorize the imposition of such liability on a party who acts with the purpose of facili-
tating that violation (provided, of course, that the actus reus requirement is also satis-
fied)." Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
146. The Kiobel majority similarly misinterpreted Justice Breyer's reference to Sosa's
footnote 20, which reads: "A related consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or an individual. Compare Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)
(insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law),
with Kadic v. Karddzfc, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (sufficient consensus in
1995 that genocide by private actors violates international law)." Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). This footnote focuses on the distinction
between state and private actors. The true import of this statement is that if interna-
tional law recognizes a norm of conduct for private actors, the norm does not distin-
guish between the type of private actor.
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the international norm in question necessarily distinguishes between types
of private actors for allowing civil liability.
Moreover, while Talisman Energy is most famous for setting the mens
rea standard for aiding and abetting at purpose, 1 47 the majority's reason-
ing also implied the possibility of corporate liability under the ATS.
Instead of simply holding that corporations could not be liable under the
ATS and discharging the need to establish a mental state, the Talisman
Energy court established the mental state and then considered if the defen-
dant corporation actually acted with purpose. 148 The majority analyzed
four actions undertaken by the defendant and concluded that because the
actions could have had "benign and constructive" objectives, did not
amount to "substantial assistance," or were not supported by the evidence,
the plaintiffs could not show that the defendant acted with purpose. 1 4 9 In
asserting that mere complicity without showing a purpose is "not enough,"
the majority's reasoning implies that perhaps the plaintiffs production of
direct and incontrovertible evidence of the defendant's purposeful assis-
tance in human rights violations would be "enough" for the court to hold
the defendant liable under the ATS. 150
Additionally, American law currently enables corporations to do
nearly everything that natural persons can do and imposes similar obliga-
tions. 15 1 While the Kiobel majority seeks to distinguish between corpora-
tions and individuals as private legal actors, recent case law suggests a
closing gap between the two under American law. For instance, the
Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,'5 2 held
that political speech does not lose its First Amendment protections simply
because its speaker is a corporation and not a natural person. 1 53 Most
importantly, the Court looked at reasons offered in precedent for distin-
guishing corporations from individuals for First Amendment purposes 154
and expressly rejected these reasons as insufficient to justify blocking one
type's political speech but not the other's.155 While Citizens United does
not discuss international law, the Court's reasoning demonstrates that
because corporations and individuals share fundamental rights, they also
share fundamental obligations.
147. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2009).
148. Id. at 260.
149. Id. at 262-63.
150. Id. at 263.
151. Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International Law? 4 (N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Note Series, Working Note No. 10-77,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703465 (noting that corporations "can
sue and be sued, be taxed, own property, enjoy constitutional protections, contract, and
be criminally prosecuted").
152. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
153. Id. at 900.
154. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990) (not-
ing that state law affords to corporations "special advantages-such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets").
155. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 876, 905 (2010).
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International law imposes liability on private actors, and, under the
Second Circuit ATS precedent and the Citizens United schema, which blend
the rights and duties of private individuals and private corporations, it is
no stretch to hold private American corporations liable for violating the
law of nations. Corporations clearly benefit from international law, and
international law can provide for international legal obligations for corpo-
rations. ' 5 6 Additionally, the amount of wealth within corporations and the
amount of damage they can inflict makes individual liability of corporate
decision makers undesirable. 157 Therefore, the outcome most consistent
with the goals of international law and the framework of the ATS and
American corporate law would be for U.S. courts to hold that at least some
corporations can be held liable under the ATS.
C. Kiobel Conflicts with the Rule-of-Law Principle that No Entity
Benefiting from the Protection of the Law Should Stand
Outside of the Law
In addition to precedential judicial support, rule-of-law principles also
favor allowing corporate liability for violations of customary international
law. While rule-of-law principles do not create the content of the law of
nations, they are highly relevant to the body of international law as guiding
principles due to their breadth and modern usage. As one scholar grudg-
ingly mused, "one cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days
without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world's
troubles."' 5 8 Although scholars have primarily analyzed the rule of law's
capacity to restrict governmental action and facilitate democracy and free
markets, one of the rule of law's fundamental tenets-that no legal entity
should stand outside the law-undeniably applies to corporate aiding and
abetting. This principle, developed and promulgated by legal philoso-
phers, has been echoed in international tribunals. 159
The rule of law, defined by Friedrich Hayek, 160 means "that the gov-
ernment in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced before-
hand."'16 1 Hayek believed that a government bound by rules would "make
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coer-
cive powers."' 6 2 Hayek warns that a law that is either too weak to prevent
156. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibil-
ity, 111 YALE LJ. 443, 449 (2001).
157. For a summary of arguments forwarding the inadequacy of individual liability,
see id. at 473-75.
158. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 95 (1998).
159. See TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 73 (Justice Jackson quoting Lord Chief Justice
Coke's rebuke to James I: "A King is still under God and the law.").
160. Hayek was a staunch proponent of the free market system. Thus, he viewed the
rule of law as a means to promote the free market, and this often meant limiting govern-
mental influence where possible. To put it simply, "Hayek regards the rule of law as a
system that articulates a free market economy." Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of
the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 255, 263 (Alvaro Santos & David Trubek eds., 2006).
161. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (2007).
162. Id.
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arbitrary government action or gives the government too much free reign is
undesirable because the government will act in its own interest or improp-
erly balance the interests of others when possible. 16 3 In contrast to the
rule of law, such an "arbitrary government" 164 contravenes free market
principles because it makes it impossible to foresee with certainty how the
government will exercise its powers and prevents individuals from making
economic plans based on that certainty. 16 5 Hayek's example of the arbi-
trary government demonstrates how the purpose of the rule of law
becomes frustrated when important actors can escape the law's reach.
In a similar vein, 166 legal philosopher Joseph Raz, focusing more on
the qualities and mechanisms of the rules, 167 saw the rule of law as a
means to protect personal autonomy. 168 Raz notes that "observance of the
rule of the law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity." 169
Therefore, a deliberate disregard for the rule of law, such as the actions of
Hayek's arbitrary government, violates human dignity because it unreason-
ably impinges on their right to control the future. 170 Raz's conception of
the rule of law supports the proposition that action in violation of the rule
of law without consequences frustrates its function. Finally, Raz postu-
lates that "if the law is to be obeyed, it must be capable of guiding the behav-
ior of its subjects.' 171 It is equally true that if the law does not guide the
behavior of its subjects, it is not being obeyed.
According to the Second Circuit, aiding and abetting human rights
abuses violates international law norms.172 This norm has two purposes.
First, it seeks to protect all human beings from such violations. Second, it
seeks to punish those who commit the violations. An absence of corporate
liability for violations prevents fulfillment of both purposes. Like an arbi-
trary government stifles free market and individual autonomy, unchecked
corporate freedom frustrates a norm that is clearly realized by the Second
Circuit as fundamental to international customary law. 173
Moreover, the importance of the aiding-and-abetting norm's prevent-
ative purpose increases with the amount of power and influence that the
external actor has in effectuating the outcome the norm aims to prevent.
For instance, Hayek recognizes that the more the government exercises its
arbitrary powers, the less the individual is able to make accurately calcu-
lated economic plans. 174 The Kiobel majority explicitly identified states
163. Id. at 74.
164. Id. at 73.
165. Id. at 72-73.
166. With respect to the idea that none of the rule of law's subjects should escape its
reach.
167. See Santos, supra note 160, at 260.




171. Id. at 214.
172. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007).
173. Id. at 270.
174. See HAYEK, supra note 161, at 73.
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and individuals as subjects that can be held liable for violations of the law
of nations, 175 but corporations often exert more control over human rights
victims than governments. 176 This is certainly the case in Kiobel, where
SPDC, among others, allegedly ravaged the Ogoniland and contaminated
its rivers in a quest for oil, but provided negligible benefits to its inhabi-
tants in return. 177 Therefore, the effect of the Kiobel ruling is to uphold a
fundamental, universally accepted norm of conduct, but to then exclude
actors who have the capacity to violate the norm to the greatest degree and
in the most egregious manners. Corporations earn profits by actions the
norm seeks to prohibit and can successfully shield those profits from vic-
tims' claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of con-
ducting the heinous operation in the corporate form. 178 Such violations
are both contrary to the basic tenets of the rule of law and to the purpose of
the particular norm in question.
IV. Problems Raised by the Failure of the Kiobel Reasoning and the
Allowance of ATS Corporate Cases
A. Corporate Liability Raises Issues Concerning Both Procedural
Inefficiency and Foreign Legal Systems
Contrary to the reasoning of the Kiobel majority, corporations can be
held liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations without a prece-
dent norm of corporate liability for such violations. Nuremberg shows that
corporate civil liability under the ATS coheres to international law, and
corporate liability is the logical consequence of the Khulumani and Talis-
man Energy holdings. Nevertheless, extension of ATS liability past individ-
uals raises several serious issues. Due to corporations' often significant
financial resources and domestic influence, corporate regulation is more
likely to affect a greater number of people, policies, and governments than
individual liability. Because Kiobel should not prevent corporate ATS liabil-
ity, the following problems could arise:179
175. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010).
176. See Ratner, supra note 156, at 461 (noting that "trends in modern international
affairs confirm that corporations may have as much or more power over individuals as
governments").
177. See HRW REPORT, supra note 3.
178. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150 (Leval, J., concurring).
179. This Note focuses on additional problems of hearing corporate cases under the
ATS. It largely ignores other problems inherent in ATS litigation in general. For
instance, the requirement of exhaustion demanded by many U.S. courts mandates that
the courts consider the competency of foreign courts, which undermines comity. See PT
United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d. 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998)
("considerations of comity [should] preclude a court from adversely judging the quality
of a foreign justice system"); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that ATS cases are properly considered for exhaustion). This risk to
comity is present in all ATS cases. Hearing corporate cases would only affect this risk to
the extent that allowing corporate ATS cases would increase the number of times federal
courts would evaluate foreign justice systems. Additionally, this list is not exhaustive.
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(1) International Forum Shopping and Congestion of U.S. Courts. As
noted in Kiobel, the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional provision unlike
any other in American law, and of a kind apparently unknown to any
other legal system in the world in that it is a statutory grant of universal
jurisdiction.18 0 A new capacity to sue corporations combined with no
ceiling on recovery would likely further incentivize plaintiffs to bring
suits in the United States when some should be properly brought else-
where. Because the number of ATS claims would likely increase, a risk
of court congestion would arise.
18 1
(2) Absence of Notice for the Defendant. Because the Dutch, Nigerian, and
British defendants in Kiobel operated in Nigeria, they likely presumed
Nigerian law would govern their actions. To hold similarly situated
defendants liable for a crime yet to be recognized by international law as
applicable to corporations would raise due process issues of notice.
18 2
(3) Procedural Inefficiency Due to the Availability and Location of Evi-
dence. The majority of the evidence presented and of the witnesses in
Kiobel were located outside of the United States. For example, while
some eyewitnesses have been exiled to the United States, 18 3 others,
including Nigerian soldiers or defense witnesses, likely remain in Nige-
ria. Similarly, corporate records of communication with the Nigerian
government will likely be found either in Nigeria or the place of incorpo-
ration of the defendant. Therefore, in Kiobel-like cases, the U.S. legal
system will often be no better than the third-best option from a procedu-
ral efficiency standpoint.
(4) Undue Influence on Extraterritorial Legal Systems, Markets, and Com-
merce (Territoriality). Even though U.S. courts would act under the
ATS, the principles of sovereignty underlying international law do not
disappear in cases of universal jurisdiction. 18 4 Holding Dutch and Brit-
ish corporations (enterprises in third-states' 8 5 ) liable for an offense
with no connection to the U.S. could directly affect labor markets, inter-
national trade, and stock value without the United States having a sub-
stantial connection to the controversy. In addition, while regulation
could raise corporations' standard of care, it may also deflect foreign
direct investment by making corporations more reluctant to invest in
developing countries with possible human rights problems.
(5) International Political Backlash/Undue Influence on Foreign Rela-
tions. Despite the universality of the norms allegedly violated by the
180. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115.
181. Although recent scholarship has shown that human rights victims have been
relying less on the Alien Tort Statute to bring claims, if corporate liability became a
possibility under the ATS, an increase in ATS suits against corporations would be the
most likely result. See Jonathan Drimmer, Jonathan Drimmer on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Shell and the Alien Tort Statute, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5442, Dec. 10, 2010, at 4.
182. While this risk would be substantially reduced once precedent is clearly deter-
mined, the notice issue is a real concern present in expanding liability.
183. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
184. See, e.g., Attorney-General of the Gov't of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 91 44
(Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961) (reprinted in relevant part, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1962))
(considering how violations to Argentina's sovereignty could affect its application of uni-
versal jurisdiction).
185. These are states that are neither the United States nor the place where the tort
occurred.
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defendant corporations, the states where the defendants are incorpo-
rated may view an ATS claim as infringing on their territorial sover-
eignty. This view could cause negative feelings towards the United
States and thus hamstring the U.S. executive branch in negotiating with
the Dutch and British governments in areas of foreign relations. Simi-
larly, such litigation could also unduly influence Dutch and British for-
eign policy with Nigeria.
(6) Reciprocal Effect-Foreign Courts Holding U.S. Corporations Liable
for Violations Occurring Outside the Territory of the Foreign Sover-
eignty. Because U.S. courts would hold foreign corporations liable for
violating the law of nations, other countries may uphold jurisdiction
when plaintiffs in those states bring suits against United States corpora-
tions. This is especially undesirable when the forum state has no con-
nection with the U.S. corporation or its conduct.
The first three problems mostly concern the smooth functioning of the U.S.
legal system and procedural fairness, while the latter three concern foreign
relations and comity. Although corporate liability is possible under the
ATS, U.S. courts should not hear cases when U.S. litigation would unrea-
sonably implicate these concerns.
Cases where the defendant is an American corporation (as opposed to
a corporate entity incorporated in a foreign country) present less risk of
these problems. While forum shopping still presents risk, using the defen-
dant's place of incorporation as the forum makes sense, and mitigates the
procedural inefficiencies. After precedent is established, these cases pre-
sent little risk of notice due process violations, and likely do not directly
affect the conduct of any foreign corporations or commerce. After all, the
idea that U.S. law can extend to American corporations conducting busi-
ness abroad is nothing new.18 6 Corporate liability under the ATS forwards
the protective principle of the custom against aiding and abetting, and does
so reasonably-within the confines of international practice and domestic
law.
Contrarily, cases with foreign defendants and foreign corporations,
like in Kiobel, present all of these concerns. The U.S. courts should not
hear them easily, and this Note will now shift focus to how to properly
limit jurisdiction in cases involving only foreign parties. The foreign policy
concerns implicated in corporate cases should compel U.S. courts to
decline jurisdiction where the defendant lacks any real connection to the
forum and the courts of another state, tied to the controversy, can afford
the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to have his case heard. Although the
Kiobel court relied on an interpretation of customary international law to
dismiss the suit against Royal Dutch,' 8 7 U.S. courts have used various pro-
cedural mechanisms to avoid complicated corporate aiding-and-abetting
186. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (2010) (criminalizing corrupt actions, such as giving or receiving bribes, under-
taken by U.S. citizens or corporations even if the conduct occurs abroad).
187. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
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cases. 188  However, no currently available mechanism adequately
addresses these foreign relations concerns, particularly with respect to the
third state involved.
B. The Currently Used Mechanisms to Address the Problems Raised by
Corporate ATS Cases
In avoiding corporate cases in the past, U.S. courts have considered
the following theories: an actor-type predicate norm under customary
international law,-8 9 forum non conveniens,190 prudential exhaustion,19 1
act of state,'192 and political question.' 93 Because this section aims solely
to demonstrate that these doctrines do not adequately consider the comity
and territoriality issues raised by corporate ATS cases, a detailed account
of the history and requirements of each doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Note. A general description of these doctrines should sufficiently demon-
strate that, with respect to Kiobel-like cases, these doctrines do not ade-
quately consider the interests of the third-state involved.
The doctrines of forum non conveniens and exhaustion act as procedu-
ral alternatives for the actor-type norm erroneously required by the Kiobel
majority. 194 Forum non conveniens allows U.S. courts to dismiss cases
where the ends of justice strongly indicate that the case should be tried
elsewhere (based on public and private interest factors). 195 Although
forum non conveniens analysis considers problems (1), (2), and (3), it does
not consider issues of international comity or foreign relations. 196 Addi-
tionally, some scholars have argued that the doctrine itself lacks consis-
tency with the goals of the ATS. 19 7 The other procedural doctrine,
prudential exhaustion, stands for the proposition that U.S. courts should
only hear cases where a plaintiff has demonstrated that the courts of his
home country are incapable of providing a fair hearing or reasonable recov-
ery. 198 Third-state interests as outlined in problem (4) clearly fall outside
the scope of prudential exhaustion, which considers only the relationship
between the United States and the country where the tort transpired.
188. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding
to the district court to answer whether the plaintiff had shown that he had exhausted
local remedies for relief); Adantu v. Pfizer, 399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that the factors of the case clearly weighed in favor of dismissing the plaintiffs
claim on the grounds of forum non conveniens).
189. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
190. See, e.g., Abdultahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d. 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
191. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
192. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
193. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, (9th Cir. 2006).
194. For discussion of the actor-type predicate norm, see supra Part 1ll.
195. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
196. See Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). When
considering the Gilbert public interest factors, the court looked narrowly towards imme-
diate local interests rather than the impact of litigation on territoriality and comity.
197. See Kee, supra note 56, at 522 (noting that because the ATS requires that the tort
occur in a foreign country, all ATS cases will a priori fall within forum non conveniens).
198. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
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Similarly, the act-of-state and political-question doctrines do not
address problem (4) and, thus, likely do not apply. The act-of-state doc-
trine forbids U.S. courts from inquiring into the public acts of a recognized
sovereign power within its own territory. 199 This doctrine does not apply
to Kiobel-like cases, because although the acts of the corporate defendants
have some ties to foreign sovereigns, the corporations in question do not
act under the color of government action. 20 0 Finally, the political-question
doctrine renders controversies nonjusticiable if they revolve around policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolu-
tion to the halls of Congress or the confines of the executive branch. 20 1
Although the political-question doctrine addresses foreign relations con-
cerns and reciprocity-problems (5) and (6)-it looks internally to consti-
tutional power structure rather than to the judicial and commercial
interests of third-states. The doctrine, which has been criticized as vague
and unpredictable, 20 2 also likely does not apply to Kiobel-like cases
because courts have ruled that similar controversies do not constitute polit-
ical questions.20 3
Due to the specific function of these mechanisms, concerns of third-
party state territoriality and comity fall outside of their individual scopes.
If Kiobel is overturned or not followed, U.S. courts will need to address the
changing landscape of ATS litigation by either adapting existing jurisdic-
tion-limiting tests or developing new ones. Rather than relying on the
Kiobel actor-type requirement and other mechanisms, courts should apply
a reasonableness test grounded in the doctrine of international comity,
which generally means deference to a foreign nation's legislative, executive,
or judicial enactment. 20 4 Because corporate civil liability under interna-
199. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
200. See Kiobelv. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (not-
ing that the defendants were charged with providing only assistance rather than acting
under the control of the Nigerian government).
201. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
202. See ERWIN CHEMER1NSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 149 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that
the factors relied upon by the court "seem useless in identifying what constitutes a polit-
ical question"). Compare Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that transnational corporate activity inciting a civil war did not constitute a
political question even though the State Department asserted interest in the ATS case)
with Hereros v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 232 Fed. Appx. 90, 95-96 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that the issue of slave labor merited status as a political question
because the judiciary was poorly equipped to address the issue).
203. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). Rio Tinto
presented a similar issue to Kiobel. In Rio Tinto, plaintiffs from Papua New Guinea
alleged that a mining organization had aided the government in committing crimes
against humanity and inciting a civil war. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the
controversy did not present a political question. Id. So long as judicially manageable
standards existed to resolve the controversy in Kiobel, the case would likely not consti-
tute a non-justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(outlining, inter alia, such a requirement).
204. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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tional law presents a new recognition of liability, U.S. courts must proceed
with caution.
20 5
V. Development of the Reasonableness Test for ATS Jurisdiction
Under the Umbrella of International Comity
A. Description of the Reasonableness Test
A more detailed and expansive reasonableness test for declining juris-
diction based on the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 403 could supplement the doctrines described above by consider-
ing the interests of all countries with contacts to the case. 20 6 Because
§ 403 applies to prescriptive jurisdiction 20 7 it can offer some guidance as
to when federal courts should hear corporate ATS cases. The Restatement
prohibits states from exercising prescriptive jurisdiction when exercising
such jurisdiction would be unreasonable 20 8 and offers relevant factors to
determine reasonableness. 20 9 Courts should consider these factors with
respect to the facts of corporate ATS cases:
(a) the link of the activity to... the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) [t]he importance of regulation to the regulating state,... and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
205. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004) (warning that "many
attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of interna-
tional law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be
undertaken, if at all, with great caution").
206. Courts have only applied international comity in a handful of ATS cases. This is
likely because cases could be dismissed for other reasons. However, when courts have
applied the doctrine, application has been amorphous. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d
1069. This note examines how the doctrine should be applied, absent a conflict of laws
requirement and with consideration of § 403. Should courts require a conflict of laws to
exist, the § 403 test should still apply, but it should be seen as independent of the inter-
national comity doctrine.
207. Jurisdiction to prescribe means that a state may make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, by legisla-
tion, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination
of a court. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 401(a). ATS jurisdiction, based on violations
of the law of nations, is best characterized as universal jurisdiction, which is a basis for
prescriptive jurisdiction under the Restatement. See id. § 404.
208. Id. § 403(1).
209. Id. § 403(2).
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(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 210
Because the ATS applies only to violations of the law of nations, 21 1 some of
these factors, like § 403(2)(h), may become less relevant. However, appli-
cation of the § 403 standard would address the comity concerns unad-
dressed by the procedural and doctrinal mechanisms. The Restatement
also takes into account the potential undue influence on foreign commerce
and impact on international political relations, 2 12 as well as a third state's
interest in hearing the case. 2 13 Finally, by taking into account the interest
of other countries, U.S. courts will also minimize the chance that foreign
legal systems will arbitrarily hear cases against U.S. corporations when the
corporation has no connection with the forum.
As a preliminary matter, courts should not consider the interests of
states that do not provide an adequate alternative forum. 214 Therefore, in
corporate ATS cases, so long a third state provided an adequate forum a
U.S. court should dismiss if, when weighing the § 403 factors, it finds U.S.
jurisdiction to be unreasonable. 2 15 In addition to the practical advantages
of the reasonableness test, the Restatement has support in recent prece-
dent. For instance, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
the factors raised in § 403 when considering the appropriateness of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.2 16 The Second Circuit, in Kiobel,
relied on the Restatement as an authority on international law.217 Courts,
in deciding whether to invoke international comity, frequently look to
§ 403 to decide whether it is reasonable to exercise prescriptive jurisdic-
210. Id. These considerations are not exhaustive. Id. § 403 cmt. b.
211. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
212. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403(2)(e).
213. Id. § 403(2)(g).
214. This is also a requirement of forum non conenviens. For a discussion of what
constitutes an adequate alternative forum, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
255 n.22 (1982) (reasoning that a reduced amount of recovery does not make an alter-
native forum inadequate).
215. This Note aims primarily to point out that courts should consider § 403 factors
when faced with jurisdictional questions. Section 403 contemplates that there may be
variation in what courts find reasonable. While some courts may require that a true
conflict of laws be present for a dismissal based on international comity, the foreign
relations concerns implicated by corporate regulation suggest that the absence of a true
conflict should not bar dismissal. In fact, deferring to foreign courts with similar laws
that have a greater interest actually forwards the principle of forum non conveniens,
which requires an adequate alternative forum where the plaintiff can have his or her case
heard. Even though the conflict of laws problem implicates two different doctrines, it is
somewhat paradoxical to hold that a case should not be dismissed when no alternative
forum exists while also holding that a case should only be dismissed if the alternative
forum's law conflicts with U.S. law to such a degree that the outcome of the case may be
different.
216. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
217. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010).
Vol. 44
2011 Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute 687
tion.2 18 Therefore, application of a § 403 reasonableness test to ATS corpo-
rate cases would represent a natural extension of the international-comity
doctrine.
B. Application of the Reasonableness Test to Kiobel
Under the facts of Kiobel, the exercise of jurisdictions by federal courts
would likely be unreasonable. Section 403(2), factors (a) and (b) weigh
strongly in favor of litigation in Nigeria, the Netherlands, or Great Brit-
ain.2 19 The alleged tortious activity took place mostly in Nigeria and
involved Dutch, Nigerian, and British citizens or corporations. Even
though Royal Dutch has an American subsidiary, Shell Oil,220 the United
States has neither a link to the territory of the tortious activity nor to the
actual parties involved. Because the United States lacks such a link, litiga-
tion in the United States would present practical obstacles to an expedi-
tious trial.2 2 1 While the United States has an interest in hearing cases that
involve violations of the law of nations22 2 -factor (c) 22 3 -the justified
expectation of the parties would be frustrated by the application of the law
of a forum that has little nexus with the controversy-factor (d). 224 Extra-
territorial regulation by the United States of Royal Dutch would also have
negative economic, comity, and political consequences warned against in
Part V.A and raised as a consideration in § 403(2)(e). 2 25
The Netherlands and Great Britain have a greater importance in regu-
lating because regulation will impact their own corporations.2 26 For exam-
ple, under U.S. law, plaintiffs could receive so large a recovery against
Shell2 27 that the amount would offend the deliberate recoverable limit
placed on suits by British courts. Thus, even if the plaintiff met his burden
for exhaustion, the court should still dismiss the case to either the Nether-
lands or Great Britain, each of which have a substantially greater interest in
corporate regulation. In this case, U.S. law should not displace British or
Dutch law with respect to how the defendants would be punished if faced
218. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, rev'd in part, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). The
district court's ruling on international comity was upheld on appeal. Id. at 1211.
219. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403(2)(a), (b).
220. See Who We Are, SHELL OIL, http://www.shell.us/home/content/usa/aboutshell/
who -we -are (last visited May 29, 2011) (stating that Shell Oil operates in the United
States).
221. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). This concern is addressed
by forum non conveniens, but it is offered to show that the § 403 test could consider
procedural efficiency if necessary.
222. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000).
223. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403(2)(c).
224. Id. § 403(2)(d).
225. Although the test does not take into account the impact of litigation on U.S.
foreign relations (this concern is within the purview of the political question doctrine),
such deference may have the same outcome with respect to the preservation of foreign
relations that the political question doctrine aims to realize.
226. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403(2)(g).
227. This entity is the British corporation named as a defendant in Kiobel. Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
Cornell International Law Journal
with an unfavorable ruling.228 Such a result would largely avoid negative
impacts on foreign relations or a reciprocal effect on U.S. corporations.
Although § 403 analysis would not preclude dismissal on other grounds, it
would act as the only safeguard to comity and international relations when
dismissal on other currently available grounds is unjustified.
VI. Assessing Two Potential Problems with the § 403 Reasonableness
Test
While implementing a § 403 reasonableness test for exercising juris-
diction in ATS cases against corporations would properly contemplate the
possible impact of retained jurisdiction on foreign relations, the test raises
at least two concerns. First, application of § 403 in Kiobel-like cases will
almost always result in dismissal, and thus will leave the plaintiff with no
recourse while potentially causing choice of law problems abroad. Second,
the § 403 analysis, as a discretionary test, increases court flexibility and
thereby risks inconsistent or uneven legal application. This section will
address these issues.
A. Section 403 Reasonableness Will Often Yield Dismissal in Cases
Involving Third States and No American Defendants
In Kiobel-like cases with foreign corporate defendants, § 403 balancing
will often yield dismissals because factors (a) and (b) focus on contacts. If
the courts of the plaintiffs home state cannot afford him a fair opportunity
to hear his case and U.S. courts dismiss his case to the courts of the place
of incorporation of the defendant, the plaintiffs recovery then becomes
contingent upon the law of the transferee court. Because many countries
lack statutory enactments that grant jurisdiction to hear cases that allege
violations of international law,2 2 9 plaintiffs may have no choice but to
allege breaches of the transferee forum's domestic law. This change could
result in the transferee court having no jurisdiction prescribed by domestic
law. Moreover, even if the transferee court found that it had jurisdiction to
hear the case, application of domestic choice of law could result in the
tangled mess of a European court applying Nigerian tort law to actions that
transpired in Nigeria. 230
Nevertheless, deference to foreign legal systems should be the foremost
jurisdictional consideration, especially when the cases do not involve
American defendants. The general principle of territoriality underlying
228. International law allows leeway for countries to decide how to punish violators
of international law. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir.
2007) (Hall, J., concurring).
229. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115.
230. See Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law, art. 133 (2007), translated
by Umbricht Attorneys, Zurich (Switzerland), available at http://www.umbricht.ch/pdf/
SwissPIL.pdf ("If the tortfeasor and the injured party do not have their place of habitual
residence in the same State, the claims shall be governed by the law of the State in which
the tort was committed.").
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§ 403 supports such a conclusion. 23 1 Thus, dismissing nearly all cases
involving only foreign parties where an adequate alternative forum exists is
likely the result that balances principles of comity with the rights of the
plaintiff. Because under international law each nation should deal with
violators as it sees fit,23 2 the United States should not police corporate
action where other nations are better positioned to do so. Additionally,
because the § 403 test would allow U.S. courts to hear ATS cases where a
strong U.S. interest or other relevant contacts counterbalance the connec-
tion of corporate defendants to other sovereigns, not all cases would be
dismissed. As such, the § 403 test presents a solution that favors the plain-
tiff more than the impossibility of corporate liability under Kiobel.2 33
While the influence of territoriality and international relations on ATS
jurisdictional decisions will likely come at the expense of some plaintiffs'
recoveries, foreign interest should be a foremost consideration. 23 4
Additionally, recent court decisions suggest that foreign courts have
become more receptive to hearing complaints of plaintiffs who allege that
corporations have violated their human rights.235 Courts of Australia,
England, Wales, and Canada have all heard such claims.23 6 Thus, dismis-
sal does not necessarily preclude recovery. Moreover, while a reasonable-
ness test might frequently result in dismissals, it preserves the plaintiffs
capacity to sue corporations under the ATS, and that ability acts as a pow-
erful bargaining chip during settlement talks. For instance, despite several
legal obstacles facing the Nigerian plaintiffs in Wiwa, they negotiated a set-
tlement with Royal Dutch Shell for $15.5 million.237 A recent multi-million
dollar settlement between British Petroleum and Colombian farmers fur-
ther demonstrates how such settlement power also extends to cases
abroad.2 38 Therefore, a test that dismisses cases when exercising jurisdic-
tion would be unreasonable would strike a proper balance between foreign
relations concerns and respect for the plaintiffs position.
B. Section 403 Balancing Risks Uneven and Unpredictable Application
In addition to possible unfairness to plaintiffs, § 403 analysis may pre-
sent a source of confusion and inconsistent decisions by courts due to the
231. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 402 (laying out the concept of territoriality).
232. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall,
J., concurring).
233. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
234. See supra Part IV.
235. See Drimmer, supra note 181, at 4 (noting that transnational tort cases against
corporations are now being raised abroad).
236. See id. (citing Ramirez v. Copper Mesa Mining Corp., CV09-37504 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
filed March 3, 2009) (Canada); Dagi v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd., [1997)
1 V.R. 428 (Australia); Lubbe v. Cape Plc., [2000] 4 All E.R. 268 (England); Guerrero v.
Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB)).
237. Jim Lobe, Saro-Wiwa Settlement Latest Vindication of 1789 Law, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, Jun. 9, 2009, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47156.
238. See Drimmer, supra note 181, at 4 (referencing Pedro Emiro Florez Arroyo v. BP
Petroleum (Colombia) Ltd., Particulars of Claim, Claim No. HQ08X00328 (High Court
of Justice Dec. 1, 2008)).
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discretion allowed by the Restatement. Although the reasonableness test
has many factors, its application will often result in dismissal when the
defendant is foreign and retained jurisdiction when the defendant is Amer-
ican. Having a rule (not based on reasonableness) that dismisses cases
with foreign defendants would likely have the advantages of predictability,
clarity, and consistency. 23 9
While a sacrifice of some consistency is inevitable, a discretionary test
better addresses the nature and magnitude of the concerns raised by trans-
national corporate aiding-and-abetting cases. The degree to which litiga-
tion in the United States forum legitimately affronts an interest of a foreign
sovereign 240 can only be determined by weighing the interest of another
country in connection with the controversy against the value to the United
States of domestic litigation. The shortcoming of using a rule-based solu-
tion to determine ATS jurisdiction over corporations is most evident in ATS
cases involving multiple corporate defendants. For instance, if one of the
three defendants in Kiobel were American and had little role in the alleged
tortious activity, it would make little sense to ignore the impact of litigation
on the Dutch and British economies and U.S. relations with those coun-
tries for the sake of an easily determinable outcome. The comity concerns
raised by extraterritorial application of U.S. law simply cannot be ade-
quately addressed by a numerical calculus. Additionally, because many of
the § 403 factors concern questions of nexus, most cases involving solely
foreign parties would be dismissed unless there is a strong U.S. interest in
the case. Thus, a § 403 reasonableness test for ATS jurisdiction over corpo-
rations would offer some degree of consistency. In preserving the plain-
tiff's right to sue while offering some predictability, the § 403 test cures a
glaring omission of current doctrines with respect to the negative externali-
ties possibly created by corporate ATS liability.
Conclusion
Contrary to the Kiobel holding, corporations can be held liable for aid-
ing and abetting human rights violations under customary international
law without a precedent norm of corporate liability for such violations. If
the majority were correct, the IMT at Nuremberg, one of the pillars of inter-
national law, would have misinterpreted customary international law by
prosecuting individuals. Thus, Nuremberg demonstrates that corporate
civil liability under the ATS can cohere to international law, and corporate
liability is the logical consequence of Khulumani and Talisman Energy,
which implicitly recognize corporate liability so long as the defendant acts
with purpose. Nevertheless, possible expansion of ATS liability to corpora-
tions would raise concerns ranging from procedural inefficiencies to the
corrosion of comity and foreign relations. The severity and risk of these
239. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179-80 (1989) (noting that compared to discretionary tests, rules offer the advantages
of predictability and consistency).
240. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998).
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concerns magnify in cases like Kiobel, which lack U.S. parties on either
side.
While procedural mechanisms such as forum non conveniens and
exhaustion address the procedural efficiency issues, the problems of com-
ity and foreign relations do not fall within the doctrines' scope. Although
the political-question doctrine does address the latter concerns to some
degree, it may not apply in some circumstances, like Kiobel, where the U.S.
executive branch has not asserted an interest in the case and another coun-
try has a strong interest in having the controversy litigated in its own
forum. Because the § 403 reasonableness test considers foreign relations
interests and U.S. connections, U.S. courts should apply it to ATS cases
involving corporations. Moreover, even if federal courts do follow Kiobel,
the reasonableness test for international comity could still inform jurisdic-
tional decisions in ATS cases involving foreign individuals as defendants
when the controversy implicates a strong interest of another sovereign.
Nevertheless, if human rights victims, like the Ogonis, acquire the capacity
to sue corporations under the ATS, U.S. courts will need to carefully con-
sider jurisdictional limits. Yet, such consideration represents the next step.
The realization of relief must first begin with the possibility of relief. The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg and Second Circuit prece-
dent, at a very minimum, illuminate this possibility.

